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Introduction
By comparing the interpretation of dharma in the ancient Indian Laws of Manu
(Manusmṛti) with the concepts of dao 道 in the Chinese classic, Daodejing 道德經, I will
demonstrate that, despite the plausible perception that the former represents despotic,
hierarchical governance while the latter promotes freedom (and even anarchy), the two
texts in fact share a similar envision of human flourishing through the following of one's
nature, as well as a foundational belief that both laws and political ideals emerge from
nature.
The Laws of Manu, dated between 1250 BCE by the nineteenth century philologist
Sir William Jones and second to third century CE by contemporary indologist Patrick
Olivelle, is generally considered one of the most important texts in ancient India to justify
discrimination based on caste. Though scholars doubt whether the Laws of Manu was ever
put into force in ancient India as a law code, as opposed to being regarded merely as a
religious text, most of them agree that it was translated by the British colonizers, who in
turn used it to form the basis of Hindu law under the colonial British Raj (Das). Probably
because of its close connection with the caste system and the colonial past, the Laws of
Manu has been unpopular and even notorious to many modern western thinkers as well as
leaders of the modern Indian independence movement. William Jones, as an English
supreme court judge in Bengal during the colonial period, might be supposed to have
praised the Laws of Manu, since it was the foundation of Indian law designed by the
British. However, Jones criticized the text strongly, writing that it “contains… many
1

blemishes which cannot be justified or palliated. It is a system of despotism and priestcraft”
(Jones 88). Resistance to the text has been even stronger since the initiation of the
independent movement against the British colonizers. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar, one of
the founding fathers of the Republic of India, considered the Laws of Manu as the primary
source of the inhuman caste system in India, and burnt it in a bonfire during a protest in
1927 (Dirks 255-274). Similarly, Jayaram V, a contemporary writer on Indian religions and
philosophy, believes that ancient law books like the Laws of Manu thwart India from
developing into an “egalitarian society.” He further asserts that “it is time [to] consign [the
Laws of Manu] to the dustbin of history” (Jayaram).
On the other hand, the Daodejing, as well as the Daoist philosophy inspired by it, is
perceived by many people, especially in contemporary western countries, to be one of the
first “clear expressions of an anarchist sensibility” (Josh). For example, Mark Gillespie
argues that to anarchists, “one is only alive when one is free,” and that the Daodejing, by
suggesting states should leave their people act on their wills on topics such as taxes and
relations with neighbors, shares a fundamental premise with anarchism (Gillespie). In a
related but also somewhat distinctive fashion, within Chinese popular culture Daoism is
usually portrayed as apolitical. While Confucianism encourages people to actively join the
political affairs jiji rushi 積極入世 (lit. actively entering the society), mainstream Chinese
culture generally considers Daoism the opposite of Confucianism, and thus related to the
passivity or reluctance to join political discussions, or xiaoji chushi 消極出世 (lit. being
passive and detaching from the society) (Yi 129). This is why in many Chinese films or
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television dramas, students of Confucianism all have the ambition to pass the imperial
examination and become part of the government, while the Daoists, often retired
government officials, live a secluded life deep in the mountains; Confucians debate policies
in the imperial court, while the presence of Daoists in the imperial palace is usually limited
to religious ceremonies.
In short, the Law of Manu might be read as a work of propaganda and a set of
restrictions that aim to consolidate the political power of the Brahmin caste, given that
Manu1 asserts “the excellence of the Brahmin” (M 1:92-101) and places great emphasis on
discipline and submitting to the status quo. On the other hand, Daoism is usually perceived
as apolitical, and the Daodejing is often read—especially in the modern West—as a one of
the first works to introduce the idea of anarchism, since its purported author Laozi 老子
(lit. Old Master) criticizes the hierarchies and rules of a conservative “Confucian” regime,
and promotes wuwei 無爲 (lit. no action) as a “method” for sages and rulers. However, in
this thesis I will argue that such interpretations of the two classics miss some important and
interesting subtleties within each of these influential classic texts. While “Manu” (the
central figure in the Laws of Manu) accepts the privileged status of the Brahmin or priestly
caste, there are strong hints in the text of a view of nature and the cosmos that imply a
measure of equality across social divisions. To Manu, people of different castes have
different duties and capacities; performing their caste-distinctive duties and fulfilling their
capacities is the only way to manifest their own dharma; in turn, fulfilling their dharma is

1

 In

this thesis “Manu” refers to the “voice” in the Laws of Manu.
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completing the world in its natural state, and people of all castes thereby enter the world of
harmony. This is probably why the other founding father of independent India, Mahatma
Gandhi, argued against Ambedkar, and claimed that the text included “lofty teachings,”
despite its “inconsistency and contradictions” (Gandhi 129). While Gandhi criticized caste
discrimination for harming India’s development, he believed discrimination had little to do
with Hinduism and ancient texts, such as the Laws of Manu. He argued that the text
“defined not one’s rights but one’s duties, that all work from that of a teacher to a janitor
are equally necessary, and of equal status” (Dirks 255-274). While the Laws of Manu
imposes restrictions on people, it does not deprive their right to “happiness.”
Similarly, though Laozi does advocate wuwei for sages and rulers, he actually
means ruling in accordance with dao 道 (usually translated as Way but perhaps more
effectively as “self-so-ing”), rather than doing nothing. Arguably, when one who has
“attained” (or manifested) the dao acts, she2 is not acting, because she is naturally
performing, rather than “actively acting.” As scholar Franciscus Verellen claims, the
“political attitudes [of the Daodejing] are on the whole pragmatic, and its mystical insights,
rather than denying worldly reality, claim a ‘truer’ grasp of the sources and exercise of
power” (Verellen 77-78). The laissez-faire style of governing in the Daodejing is a political
approach proactive in another sense––it is an effort of the sagacious rulers to actively
maintain the harmony of dao. Moreover, far from encouraging people to retreat from the
 Since the term “he/she” is lengthy, in this thesis, I will use the pronoun “he/him/his” when
referring to “someone” in the Laws of Manu, and use “she/her/her” when referring to
“someone” in the Daodejing, considering the Daodejing has more feminine elements and a
more feminine tone.
2
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conventional society and to pursue a secluded life deep in the mountains, as shown in many
films concerning the Daoists, the Daodejing suggests that its teaching is to be manifested in
everyday life.
With the goal to counter the misleading unilateral interpretation of the two texts and
to bring the two together through their similarities in (human) nature and human
flourishing, chapter one of this thesis explicates the relations to nature of dharma and dao. I
will start with the etymologies of the two words and then show that their approaches to
nature are in fact remarkably similar. Dharma derives from the sanskrit root dhri-, believed
to mean “to support and hold up” (Easwaran 31), and has etymological relation with the
Lithuanian words derme (agreement) and darma (harmony) (Brugmann 100). Therefore, it
can be translated as truth or law that both supports the world and allows the world to come
into its natural state of harmony. On the other hand, dao derives from two parts––shu 疋
(lit. foot), conveying the sense of “to go through,” and shou 首 (lit. head), meaning “to give
a heading” (RADH 57). Dao therefore means a path that leads to something wholesome or
rightful. In the Daodejing more specifically, dao is the way that things are naturally; it may
be understood as “truth about the natural way of being.” In similar fashion, besides what
would become the “orthodox” meaning of dharma in later “Hindu” texts such as the
Bhagavad Gita, Manu introduces an innovative one: dharma as a natural way of being that
allows everyone to fit into the world. Dharma in this sense resembles the de 德 in
Daodejing. De 德 is usually translated as “virtue,” but it is important to note that in the
Daodejing, virtue is something like “spontaneous action.” Dao is the field while de is “a
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focus of potency or efficacy within its own field of experience” （RADH 59). In this sense,
dharma of Manu is similar to both dao and de of the Daodejing. As I will argue, this
resemblance is the basis of Manu and Laozi’s similarity in political view.
Chapter two will analyze the concepts of human nature found in both the Laws of
Manu and the Daodejing. Contrary to the popular Hobbesian view that it is in the nature of
human beings to compete, to win over and to accumulate as much as possible, both Manu
and the Daodejing maintain that human nature is not rooted in desire. In Manu, laws
represent the natural state of humans. Following the laws, which strictly assign the duties
and rights to different castes, and not desiring anything else, is fulfilling one’s dharma and
waking to one’s pure and harmonious natural state. Similarly, the Daodejing “claims that it
is unnatural to have excessive desires and that having them will… paradoxically result in
destitution, want, alienation and self-destruction” (Ivanhoe vxiii). The idea of wuyu 無欲
(lit. no desire) is one of the most important concepts in the Daodejing. This term should be
understood metaphorically rather than literally. What is proposed is not an utter denial of
desire, but rather an “objectless desire… shaped not by the desire to own, to control, or to
consume, but by the desire simply to celebrate and to enjoy” (RADH 42). Meanwhile, it is
also a “subjectless desire,” since when one is manifesting dao, she acts spontaneously,
without the consciousness of self. Wuyu in the Daodejing coincides with Manu’s idea of
desire, which, at least in its “natural” form, is not about amassing power or wealth, but
rather fulfilling dharma and striving for broader human flourishing. Considering their
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similar beliefs of human nature, we can see that the superficial reading of the Laws of
Manu as a manifesto of oppressive governance is untenable.
Chapter three will examine the visions of the path to harmony and human
flourishing in the Laws of Manu and the Daodejing, as well as the political implication of
such visions. Clearly, Manu asserts that fulfilling one’s dharma is the right path, while the
Daodejing simply terms the path dao—but what does it mean to fulfil one’s dharma or to
follow dao? To Manu, fulfilling one’s dharma is to practice the duties and rights ascribed
to him as a member of the caste system. Doing so actually enables the one to position
himself in the world, and he thereby contributes to the happiness of the whole humankind,
because when everyone find their right/natural place in the world, the world is complete
and is in its pure, natural and harmonious state. Similarly, the Daodejing argues that to
realize dao, one has to eliminate thoughts, and what is “natural” will follow. When the text
states that “Dao declined as one reflects upon the things one does and seeks to understand
why one does so” (Ivanhoe xxvi), it seems to imply the Manu-like idea that duties and
rights are not something to contemplate, but rather to manifest or make one’s own (which is
what one will naturally do when one’s thoughts are eliminated). Given Manu and Laozi’s
belief that following (natural) rules is essential to attaining harmony and human
flourishing, the Laws of Manu aims for happy and fulfilling lives for all the four castes3,
might be a bit misleading to say the Laws of Manu “aims” for happy and fulfilling lives
for all castes, including the Sudra, as it is impossible for us to know the exact intention of
its writer. However, my thesis provides basis for such an alternative interpretation of the
Laws of Manu, and this interpretation, in turn, raises interesting and meaningful questions,
such as the following: if Manu did care about the Sudra’s happiness, does his care justify
limiting the Sudra’s social role to servants?
3

 It
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while the Daodejing calls for a return to the natural order—the rule of nature—rather than
anarchy or “Confucian” civilization.

Chapter 1 On the Words Dharma and Dao
Both dharma and dao are words from ancient civilizations dating back to the time of the
Vedas of India and the bronze inscriptions of Zhou dynasty China, around 1500 BCE to
770 BCE, with oral traditions that are probably even much older. Looking into the
etymology of the two words may grant us insight into their meanings, which are abstract,
subtle and usually controversial. According to Helmut Rix, the word dharma derives from
the Proto-Indo-European root *dʰer-, which is transformed into Sanskrit as dhri (Rix 145).
Most scholars, including Eknath Easwaran, whose translations of the Bhagavad Gita and
the Upanishads have enjoyed great success, understand the root dhri as “to support, hold
up or bear” (Easwaran 31). In this sense, dharma is etymologically related to Avestan
√dar- (to hold) and Latin firmus (steadfast, stable, powerful) (Brugmann 100) and bear the
meaning of “something that support the world” or “something without which the world
cannot hold”. However, according to Yoga Vidya, an organization promoting traditional
Indian culture, the Sanskrit root dhri- also means “to place,” explaining why Brugmann
claims dharma is also related to the Lithuanian word dereti [to be suited, fit] in etymology
(Easwaran 100) and why in Laws of Manu, the concept that every being has his own place
in the world is emphasized. Another understanding of dhri- is implied by Brugmann, when
he examines that dhri- has etymological relation with the Lithuanian words derme
8

(agreement) and darna (harmony) (Brugmann 100). Brugmann’s observation conforms to
Manu and the Gita’s view of dharma as a completion of the world into oneness. In later
paragraphs, I will examine the meanings of dharma in orthodox Hinduism, as expressed in
the Bhagavad Gita, and the similar yet different understanding of the word that Manu
proposes.
The three ways of approaching to dharma, as elaborated above, are 1) something
without which the world cannot hold, or simply, truth and law, 2) a natural way of being
that allows everyone to fit into the world, and 3) something that completes the world,
joining every piece of the world together harmoniously. In fact, these three interpretations
are closely entangled. They may be derived from one another and support one another.
However, some people may pay more attention to one or two aspects while others may
emphasize different aspects. The Bhagavad Gita, on one hand, associates dharma with
“support from within: the essence of a thing, its virtue, that which makes it what it is”
(Easwaran 31). This understanding is close to the first interpretation, but only on the level
of individual beings. It confirms that there are truths, but it only refers to the truths that are
particular to a group of beings. It states that there is a truth, a natural way of being for each
group of people. For example, Easwaran comments that the orthodox Hindu viewpoint sees
the Gita as a condonation of “war for the warrior class: it is the dharma, the moral duty, of
soldiers to fight in a good cause” (Easwaran 75). On a larger scale, however, the Bhagavad
Gita also considers the dharma as “the law that expresses and maintains the unity of
creation” (Easwaran 24), and “the law of life’s unity” (Easwaran 112) following the third
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interpretation that focuses on oneness and unity. This idea of unity or oneness is also
conveyed by another sacred text, the Rig Veda, where one encounters the famous verse
“Truth is one” (Easwaran 22). In this view, the true world is one entity; dharma, the law,
exemplifies this entity by including everyone and supports it by holding everything
together.
There seems to be a tension between the two understandings of dharma in the Gita.
While one implies that there are many truths, each for a certain group of people, the other
clearly states that “truth is one.” To me, the conflict between these two interpretations is
not irreconcilable. In fact, Manu does an admirable job in reconciling the two contending
views by using the second interpretation, a natural way of being that allows everyone to fit
into the world, as a bridge between the individual and the cosmic. The Gita acknowledges
that there are natural laws or truths regarding the duty of different groups of beings, but it
fails to recognizes that these different truths actually place each individual into a suitable
place in the world, and thereby complete the world into one single unity and one single
truth. It is the Laws of Manu that makes this claim. Manu believes that every caste of
human being, as well as every class of fauna and flora, has its own distinct duties and
capacities. Different castes also have different occupations and qualities, which are all
determined by birth. Because of these set ways of being, everyone is able to position
himself/herself in the world effortlessly, and “this whole world comes into being in an
orderly sequence” (M 1:27). Under this ideal state, all beings live harmoniously and
fulfillingly together, and the world has therefore become one. While Easwaran notes that

10

dharma in the Bhagavad Gita is “support from within” (BG 31), readers can see that to
Manu, dharma is more of a “support from outside,” as he emphasizes more on the
communal aspect of dharma than on the individual.
Interestingly, Manu’s ingenious way of joining the multiple truths for individuals
and the one Truth through an interpretation of dharma as a natural way of being that leads
to the one Truth is very similar to the idea of dao in the Chinese classic Daodejing. Dao is
usually translated to English as “the Way.” It is true that when the character dao 道 first
appeared in written text in the Book of Documents (c. 10th century BCE), it was within the
context of a channel for the water to flow in order to prevent flood (RADH 57)—though
Sarah Allan disagrees with this claim and suggests that the river here refers not to a canal
or a river on our globe, but rather to the Milky Way (quoted in Jia 75). Either way, these
scholars relate dao as a noun. However, unlike English, in which nouns and verbs usually
have different forms, in Chinese, especially classical Chinese, the differentiation between
nouns and verbs is not clearcut. For example, the character shu 書 means both books and to
write. As Ames, Hall and Jia point out, at least during the time of Laozi, dao was among
those words that have both meanings as a noun and a verb. Looking into the etymology of
dao may help us in understanding this claim. Dao derives from two parts––shu 疋 (foot),
conveying the sense of “to go through,” and shou 首 (head), meaning “to give a heading or
direction” (RADH 57). When used as a noun, it means a right direction to go or a path that
leads to something wholesome and upright. On the other hand, when used as a verb, it
means going in the right direction or following the wholesome/upright path. In fact, the
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word was “used frequently as a loan character for its verbal cognate dao 導 (to lead forth)”
in early Chinese texts (RADH 57 and JJH 75). Therefore, besides the often quoted
interpretation of dao as “the Way,” dao has a more dynamic aspect in its second meaning
“way-making” (RADH 57).
I found these two meanings of dao, one as a cosmic truth and the other as actions
aligned with that truth, very similar to the first and second interpretations of dharma in the
Laws of Manu: the truth of the world (ontology) as well as a natural way of being in
accordance with that truth (phenomenology).4 The contentious point over whether dharma
and dao are veritably similar or merely ostensibly similar rests on the idea of oneness.
While dharma implies a sense of establishing cosmic unity, Ames and Hall suggest the
common understanding of the Daodejing with “One-many” metaphysics, as in the title of
Arthur Waley’s translation The Way and Its Power: A Study of the Tao Te Ching and Its
Place in Chinese Thought (1934), is misleading (RADH 12). They argue that in Daoism,
there is no “permanent reality behind appearances,” no “unchanging substratum,” no
“essential defining aspect behind the accidents of change. Rather, there is just ceaseless and
usually cadenced flow of experience” (RADH 14).5 Because of its ever-changing nature, in
Daoism, the “cosmos” is not oneness, but the “ten thousand things.”
l ater chapters, I will develop in more details the idea that ontology and phenomenology
in the Laws of Manu and the Daodejing are essentially one thing, as the “truth” has to be
manifested in actions or the way of being.
5
 Though in later eras like the Ming Dynasty, one of the primary jobs for the Daoists was to
assist the emperors in developing through alchemy medicine that retained the vitality of the
emperors and prevented them from death, the Daodejing seems to suggest that both life and
death are essential for the balance of nature (PJI xviii), and rejects immortality and
permanence.
4

 In
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Both texts touch upon the creation of the universe. In the Laws of Manu, the
Self-existent Lord, who is also called “that One,” creates the world out of darkness (M
1:5-7). On the other hand, the Daodejing reads “Dao gives rise to continuity, Continuity
gives rise to difference, Difference gives rise to plurality, And plurality gives rise to the
manifold of everything that is happening (wanwu)” (DDJ 42). Since dao is itself dynamic,
the basis of Daoist metaphysics is not “One behind the many” (RADH 14), but “many
behind the many.” Such a comparison between the Laws of Manu and the Daodejing may
give rise to the mistaken view that the Laws of Manu is more rigid while the Daodejing
promotes a sense of freedom. I argue that such a viewpoint is untenable for the following
reasons. If one consider the fact that most later Hindu and even early Vedic gods (such as
Agni) can have multiple forms of being, the “Self-existing One” in the Laws of Manu may
very likely be anything but “one.” Moreover, since the Laws of Manu was, presumably, a
tool of ruling, the rulers would prefer it to be flexible, so that it can fit easily into the
different social conditions of the different periods of their reigns. It’s also important to note
that, as I will elaborate in later chapters, the idea of the so-called “freedom” in the
Daodejing is different from that assumed by most modern people. As I will argue in later
chapters, while it may be “personal” in the sense that each individual has her own path, it is
not necessary a choice, as it is predetermined “by” nature or the dao.
Another possible refutation to the idea that dharma is about rigid order while dao is
about freedom of personal choices is to understand the notion of “oneness” as community,
instead of “a single truth.” In the Laws of Manu, people are encouraged to follow their own
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dharma in order to position themselves correctly in the world and complete the world into a
oneness. This oneness is a “state” of harmony where every member lives a meaningful and
flourishing life. One can conceptualize this oneness as a harmonious community for human
beings. On the other hand, the notion of community is also an important element of the
Daodejing, regardless of the different interpretations. To “traditional” scholars studying
Daodejing, such as Philip J. Ivanhoe, Laozi believes that “the dao declined as civilization
and high culture arose” (PJI xxi), for in such a society, people try to set themselves above
others, by accumulating wealth, building military power or other means, and at the same
time “the various virtues that are heralded as the highest achievements of civilized society
become vehicles for hypocrisy, deceit and fraud” (PJI xxi). Opponents to Ivanhoe’s
interpretation may argue that, the Daodejing concerns not only the negative aspects of
civilization; it criticizes civilization as a whole, believing that any human manipulation,
including those that might seem to benefit the society. This very argument also
demonstrates the importance of the concept of “community” in Daodejing. Since people, as
any other thing in the world, are “in fact processual events, and are thus intrinsically related
to the other ‘things’ that provide them the context” (RADH 15), and since civilization
always creates difference between individuals, it is a deviation from nature, and thus is
definitely flawed. Therefore, a community where people live together harmoniously
without trying to overpower others or setting themselves out, is what Laozi proposes. (This
does not necessarily mean, however, an elimination of hierarchy in the common sense. It
only means that people do not conceptualize themselves as rulers vs. the ruled, or as the
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upper-class vs. the lower-class. On one hand, differences between individuals exist, in the
sense that people are different objectively, but on the other hand, such differences do not
exist, since there is no civilization to give rise to the concepts of hierarchy and difference.
This point will be elaborated in later chapters.)
As I have argued above, the similarities between the idea of dharma in the Laws of
Manu and that of dao in the Daodejing are striking. They both mean a cosmic truth or
cosmic truths. They both refer to the act of living a life as it is spontaneously, so as to
position themselves correctly in the world. They are both rigid in some senses and fluid in
others. And they both emphasize the importance of community. Even the fact that dharma
has lost its meaning as a verb later in the Bhagavad Gita is similar to that dao in modern
Chinese is merely a noun. In the following chapters, I will examine in details what the
cosmic truths, i.e. (human) natures, what the ways of living for human flourishing, and
what their political implications, are.

Chapter 2 On (Human) Nature in the Laws of Manu and the
Daodejing
While the idea of dharma in the Laws of Manu and that of dao in the Daodejing, on one
hand, represent a path to the Truth, what really is this path? Looking into the etymologies
of the words dharma and dao, as described in chapter one, one may realize that it means
fulfilling one’s dharma and acting in accordance with dao, or “dharma-ing” and “dao-ing.”
15

Then what does it mean to fulfill one’s dharma and to act according to dao? In the
following chapters, I will argue that it means abiding by nature. Before delving into the
matter, however, it is important to have a clear sense of what the word nature means to both
Manu and Laozi, as the Laws of Manu and the Daodejing either present or imply a very
different notion of nature from what may be assumed by modern western readers. Since the
Daodejing has explicitly foregrounded nature, I will start my interpretation with the
Daodejing.
Although the Chinese word ziran 自然 is usually translated as nature, in the sense
of environmental and ecological nature, in fact, like the word dao, which is both a noun and
a verb, ziran actually bears another meaning that is more dynamic. The first character zi 自
refers to the concept of self, as in zizun 自尊, (lit. pride), and the second character ran 然
means “in a state of...” or “has the appearance of,” as in xinran 欣然 (lit. with the
appearance of happiness). Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the original meaning of
ziran aligns more with the sense of “self-being,” which Ames and Hall render as
“spontaneously so,” than with the western or modern idea of environment and ecology. The
concept of ziran in the Daodejing concerns mainly humanity. Every time it talks about
ziran, it is in a context regarding human beings. For example, with the famous lines,

Human beings emulate the earth, The earth emulates the
heavens, The heavens emulate dao (way-making), And dao
emulates ziran (what is spontaneously so).

16

––DDJ 25

Laozi argues that “the human experience is an integral part of the majesty (of the cosmos)”
(RADH 117), while ziran is embodied by and thus can/should be found in human
experience.
Also conveyed in the lines of Chapter 25 is the idea that ziran “is an alternative to
the notion of initial beginnings” (RADH 69). There is ziran, in the beginning, and then all
other things, finally human beings, emulate it. However, since ziran comes into exist only
through the embodiment of other things, the relation between ziran and humans is not
one-way, but interdependent and ongoing. This is why Ames and Hall stress that the
“‘beginnings’ are fetal rather than primordial” (RADH 69). Ziran is the beginnings not in
the sense of time sequence, but rather in the sense of production and reproduction.
While the Laws of Manu does not mention the word nature or any equivalent, it
does share a similar idea as ziran in suggesting that the text itself is portraying a pure,
original, fetal state of the world. For example, in chapter seven “Laws for the Kings,” Manu
“deals with the origin of the king; the organization of the state machinery, including the
appointment of officials; the construction of the fort; the king’s marriage; the conduct of
foreign policy, including war; and finally taxation” (M xxxii). Patrick Olivelle notes that
Manu is “envisaging a new king occupying a virgin territory here” (M xxxii), since the king
has to build the infrastructures and state apparatus out of nothing.
Moreover, the Laws of Manu begins with the creation of the world:
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There was this world –– pitch-dark, indiscernible, without
distinguishing marks, unthinkable, incomprehensible, in a
kind of deep sleep all over. Then the Self-existent Lord
appeared –– the Unmanifest manifesting this world
beginning with the elements, projecting his might, and
dispelling the darkness.
––M 1:5-6

Then the Self-existent One further develops the world by bringing forth the waters, the sun,
the sky, the earth, and all other creatures, including human beings. “After bringing forth in
this manner the whole world, that One of inconceivable prowess once again disappear into
his own body” (M 1:51) and fall asleep in tranquility. However, when he awakes,
everything starts changing violently again.

In this manner, by waking and sleeping, that Imperishable
One incessantly brings to life and tears down this whole
world, both the mobile and the immobile.
––M 1:57
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In this sense, the natural state in the cosmology of the Laws of Manu is no less dynamic
than that in of the Daodejing. Yet another interesting similarities between the concept of
ziran in the Daodejing and the suggested natural order in the Laws of Manu is that both
imply a circular relation. As stated above, ziran gives rise to human beings while humans,
in their natural state, manifest ziran. Similarly, in the Laws of Manu, the Self-existent One
gives birth to humans and prescribes their natural state, while the idea of humans
interacting with gods, which became fully developed as the “divine play” (lila), in the later
Hindu classics, such as the Bhagavata Purana, is a necessary affirmation of the Creator’s
existence. Evidence can be found in the narrative structure of the text. The creation story
(and the whole book) is framed in layers, in which “the Creator taught the treatise he had
composed, [i.e. the Laws of Manu,] to his son, Manu, and he in turn taught it to his pupils,
including Bhrgu. It is Bhrgu who becomes the spokesman and recites the treatise to the
gathered seers” (M xxii).
The actual passage of the treatise, however, is not as simple as Olivelle’s summary.
The narrator switches back and forth among Manu, the Self-existing One, and the
anonymous “I,” probably Bhrgu. For example, in the “Second Account of Creation,” the
Self-existing One is speaking, “desiring to bring forth creatures, I heated myself with the
most arduous ascetic toil” (M 1:34). However, a few verses later, in “Cosmic cycle,” the
narrator changes back to Manu, who says “After bringing forth in this manner this whole
world and me, that One of inconceivable prowess once again disappear into his own body”
(M 1:51). At the end of Chapter One, the anonymous narrator steps back in, and calls for
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attention to his teaching, “just as, upon my request, Manu formerly taught me this treatise,
so you too must learn it from me today” (M 1:119). The situation is made even more
complex when the book introduces another meaning of Manu. According to the “Second
Account of Creation,” Manu refers not only to the son of the Self-existing One, but is also a
title of creatures of “immerse energy” by the ten great seers (M 1:36). The changing
perspective between the gods and the human “I” implies the necessity of humans to interact
with gods, i.e. the “divine play”. They believe that it is the responsibility of humans to
dance with the gods, and Manu proposes a “dance” through playing one’s role, i.e.
fulfilling one’s dharma, and thus sustaining the world.
Both the Laws of Manu and the Daodejing stress that there is “something natural”
that founds the base of the humanity, and that it need to be manifested in humans. Then
what do Manu and Laozi, the purported authors of the two texts, believe about human
nature? In the following section, I will elaborate on the ontological ideas important to the
two works by taking a closer look into specific chapters of the texts.
A common idea on human nature shared by both the Laws of Manu and the
Daodejing is the one on desires. The Daodejing explicitly expresses its view that people in
their natural state, those who are practicing the dao, or are in the dao, have no desire, which
Laozi frames as wuyu. While literally means “no desire,” wuyu must be understood
philosophically, rather than literally. The Daodejing is not arguing that people should be
shameful about their desires, abandon them, and live a austere or even ascetic life. Ames
and Hall explain wuyu as the following: what is proposed is not an utter denial of desire,
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but rather an “objectless desire… shaped not by the desire to own, to control, or to
consume, but by the desire simply to celebrate and to enjoy” (RADH 42). In my
perspective, the Daodejing is even more radical. There could neither be desire nor the need
for an effort to eliminate desire at all, because when dao is manifested, when people have
“returned” to their natural state, they will feel so content in the harmonious world that they
think about nothing else than what they have.
Speaking of human desires, people tend to think about physical or material desires
first. In fact, the Daodejing, encouraging people to adopt a non-desiring (wuyu) lifestyle,
also tries to convince people that the possession of wealth is transitory and untenable.

When treasure fills the hall,
No one is able to keep it self,
Those who are arrogant because of station and wealth
Bring calamity upon themselves.
To retire when the deed is done
Is the way (dao) that tian works.6
––DDJ 9

 The word tian is literally translated as heaven, but it is usually used very broadly to refer
to something wholesome, rightful, or natural. In this particular sentence, the literally
translation would be “... is the way (dao) of tian.” Since dao is considered wholesome and
natural, the dao of tian is just dao, and Laozi is simply just saying “... is dao” here.
6
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The commentary of Ames and Hall on this chapter focuses on the verb “fill,” and hence the
idea of fullness and extremity. They argue that in this chapter, Laozi is drawing an analogy
between the human world and the natural world (nature in the modern sense). “Taking any
endeavor to its extreme will result in a reversal of this direction and a self-induced
subversion of the enterprise” (RADH 89). They further assert that the idea presented in this
chapter is similar to a probably spurious chapter found in the Confucian classic Xunzi,
where Confucius states “you need a measure of ignorance to cope with an intelligence…
you need a measure of humility to cope with accomplishments… this is what is called the
way of draining some off and reducing the amount” (RADH 89). It is true that the concept
of not desiring fullness, usually termed as zhizu 知足 (lit. knowing the sufficiency of one’s
possession) in Chinese and translated as contentment in English, is important to the
Daodejing, as in the following passage:

Therefore, those who know contentment avoid disgrace,
And those who know where to stop avoid danger.
They will be long-enduring.
––DDJ 44

While the English word contentment fits well into Laozi’s idea of dao, the Chinese
word zhizu seems a bit ambiguous and need careful investigation. The English word
contentment is mostly a description of a mental state, but the Chinese word zhizhu,
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especially because of its Chinese characters, implies a physical state of possessing. Zhizu
literally means knowing that what one has is enough, and therefore linguistically implies a
sense of possession, since one cannot zhizu without possessing something. However, in my
opinion, to understand the essence of the Daodejing or the dao, one need to understand
zhizu metaphorically, adopting its philosophical meaning of satisfaction. To do so is to
understand that impermanence is a fundamental aspect of zhizu. Impermanence is one of
the key elements of the cosmos in the Daodejing, as elaborated in Chapter one. Since the
“ten thousand things” that comprise the cosmos are ever-changing, it is impossible to cling
onto or to possess anything, according to the Daodejing. Therefore, I believe that the main
point of Chapter 9 is not something like “do not drive to the extreme in your possessions,”
as Ames and Hall focus on in their commentary, but rather something as “do not try to
possess anything.” An important distinction to draw between the Daoist concept of
possession and the Indian one is that while the indian practice of relinquishing possession is
against the usage of the possessed things, and hence asceticism, the Daodejing takes on a
more pragmatic approach. In fact, effectively using something is manifesting the Dao,
according to Laozi. No one can keep a house full of gold and jade, not because it is full, but
because one would not be able to keep anything at all. The people who are arrogant because
of their wealth and social status are bound to calamity, not because they have gone to the
extreme, but because their wealth and status are in fact untenable –– anyone who cling onto
something is bound to calamity.

23

To me, Ames and Hall seem to have aligned too much with the Confucian idea of
the middle way or zhongyong (lit. being in the middle and plain) in Chinese, just as they
quote the Confucian Classic (though probably spurious) in their commentary. However,
while the Confucian balance is found in being in the middle and not driving to the extreme,
balance in Daoism is a character of way-making. The Confucian idea of zhongyong is more
of a cognitive concept, and thus something “active,” while the Daoist balance is found in
the “passive” spontaneity. The Daoist balance sometimes seems extreme and weird to the
conventional (Confucian) eyes, because it is not restricted by conventional morality. The
Daodejing concerns little about finding the literal balance or the midpoint between wealth
and poverty, intelligence and ignorance, timidity and courage, and etc. Instead, to Laozi,
achieving balance is nothing more than manifesting the dao, and since impermanence is
one of the most important aspect of the dao, to live a balanced life, one need to understand
that everything is impermanence and cannot be clinged onto. Therefore, Laozi proposes,
“to retire when the deed is done is the way (dao) that tian works” (DDJ 9). Having done
something, the sage leaves it as it is, instead of clinging onto it. In other words, wuyu refers
not only to zhizu and zhongyong (not desiring to possess more than one has and not desiring
to possess the fullness), but also to the idea of not desiring to possess. Things in the world
are not for the purpose of winning over, possessing or controlling, but are simply there to
be experienced and enjoyed. Such an idea aligns with what Ames and Hall term as
“objectless desire.”
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As stated above in the earlier part of the chapter, I believe that the concept of wuyu
in the Daodejing is more radical than an “objectless desire.” Radical not in the sense that it
is a total denial of desire and advocation of an ascetic lifestyle, but that few people till
today have proposed a similar idea––a subjectless desire. This denial of desire derives from
the Daodejing’s argument that in the natural state, when/where dao is manifested, there is
no awareness of self, and hence there is no subject of the action of desiring. In this sense,
the idea of wuyu is closely related to another wu-form word in the Daodejing––wuxin (lit.
no heart-mind). In one way, it is natural that no desire means altruism and thus concerning
little about one’s own, as in “Lessen your concern for yourself and reduce your desires”
(DDJ 19). However, this chapter in Daodejing is advocating people not only to lessen their
concerns for the material life, but also literally to think little about their “selves.” While
people tend to think of desires as those of physical need, there is also philosophical desires,
such as making sense of oneself. In the Daodejing, wuyu is not only a rejection of luxury
life, but also a denial of learning one’s self.
The Chinese word xin, usually translated as heart-mind, is a concept similar to the
idea of ego, inner self or one’s essence. Just like other wu-forms, wuxin is not a total
negation of one’s heart-mind. The Daodejing does not suggest that people are essence-less
entities. Rather, wuxin is a natural state when dao is manifested and when people do not
actively think of themselves as different from others. In other words, in the Daodejing, the
negation of xin is restricted to the artificial self consciousness/identity, which people create
themselves in civilized cultures. To Laozi, with the formation of civilization, people
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struggled to give shape to their own lives, and there came the created selves, which Laozi
deems as a departure from the nature or the dao. Chapter 49 of the Daodejing explicitly
states this point:

Sages [are constantly wuxin],
They take the thoughts and feelings of the common people
as their own.
…
As for the presence of sages in the world, in their efforts to
draw things together,
They make of the world one muddled mind.
––DDJ 497

some other versions, the verse “sages [are constantly wuxin] 聖人恒無心” is written as
“the Sage is without a constant mind 聖人無恒心” and the phrase hunxin 渾心 is
understood as a verb “to merge one’s mind” rather than a noun “muddled mind.” Because
of the text’s long history, we couldn’t determine whether “constantly wuxin” or “without a
constant mind” is the original. However, while the idea of no constant mind fits well with
the ever-changing Daoist cosmos, the idea of constantly wuxin fits better with and helps
readers understand other wu-forms in the Daodejing. Similarly, we could not know for sure
whether hunxin was designed to be read as a verb or a noun by Laozi. However, to
understand it as a noun, a muddled mind opens readers to an alternative interpretation of
the Daodejing. When understood as a verb, the phrase is translated as “with the world he
merges his mind” (H 120-121). Compared to “they make of the world one muddled mind,”
the sage merging one’s mind with the world seems to care about the people from above, as
opposed to be amid the people. Therefore, to read hunxin as a muddled mind enables
readers to interpret the Daodejing as not only a work for the rulers, but also a work for the
community.
7

In
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The sages, those who are “living with” the dao, do not make significance of their own
heart-minds, and thereby separate themselves from the common people. Rather, they take
the populance’s heart-mind as their own. Laozi believes that in a harmonious society, the
one when dao is manifested, people do not have their own heart-minds, but all the people
share “one muddled mind.” In my perspective, sharing one heart-mind does not only mean
that people share such solidarity that they aim for the same thing. It is more important for
people to “eliminate” their own selves and the awareness that each of them is a separate
entity. It is also important to the note that Laozi stresses on the muddled state, which might
seem to be negative in English. However, the word muddle in Chinese is a neutral word and
in the Daodejing, it is very likely to convey a positive sense, because that is one of the
characteristic of ziran, or the spontaneity. The Daoist “one mind” is a open, unorganized
one, disrupting the norms and distinct from the more restrictive Confucian or Legalist
practice. Because heart-mind is deemed unwanted and even detrimental in the Daodejing,
the desire to understand oneself is also discouraged, as in

It is on this model that the sages withdraw their persons
from contention yet find themselves out in front,
Put their own persons out of mind
yet find themselves taken care of,
Isn’t it simply because they are unselfish that they can
satisfy their own needs?
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––DDJ 7

This chapter captures the essence of wuyu very well. The first sentence talks about the
relinquishment of the desire to contend with others, either for wealth, social status, or other
benefits. The second sentence, on the other hand, talks about the desire to make sense of
oneself, such as the philosophical questions of “who am I/ where did I come from/ where
am I going to.” Laozi believes that in the pure, natural state, human beings do not
conceptualize themselves, and are pull out of their self-created heart-minds, and yet, they
are naturally taken good care of, by dao, and it is only in this state, when dao is manifested,
that people are truly content. Therefore, the word “unselfish” in the last sentence, comprises
both the altruistic idea of not contending with others for material comfort, and a literally
“self-less” mental state of human beings. Such a relinquishing of self echos with the last
sentence of Chapter 9 “to retire when the deed is done, is the way (dao) that tian works.”
On one hand, retiring from the deed implies contentment and objectless desire, as it seems
to encourage people to enjoy the process and ignore the product. On the other hand, it also
calls attention to subject-less desire, as it proposes people should disassociate their
achievements from themselves, and refrain from developing an unnatural ego.
In the Laws of Manu, on the other hand, the relation between desire and austerity is
seemingly paradoxical. At some points, the Laws of Manu praises austerity as one of the
most important practices in life:
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Knowledge, austerity, fire, food, earth, mind, water,
smearing with cow dung, wind, rites, sun, time – these are
the agents of purification for embodied beings.
––M 5:105

Being enumerated together with the fundamental elements of human beings, of all creatures
and of even the whole world, such as earth, water, sun and time, as well as with essential
aspects of human society/ civilization, such as knowledge and rites, austerity must have
been highly regarded. Austerity is also mentioned in the section “Mode of Life” (M 6:
5-28) together with “Great Sacrifices.” Considering how important sacrifices are to ancient
Indians, one may easily sense the weight Manu has put on austerity.
When thinking of austerity, the image of a monk emaciated due to self-starvation,
beating himself with a wooden stick, might come to many people’s mind. In fact, the Laws
of Manu also have detailed instruction of how one should engage in physical
self-punishment:

He should… surround himself with the five fires in the
summer; live in open air during the rainy season; and wear
wet clothes in the winter––gradually intensifying his ascetic
toil… and engaging in ever harsher ascetic toil, he should
inflict punishment on his body.
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–– M 6:22-24

Advocating all such self-inflicting, is the Laws of Manu a entirely different in its
fundamental beliefs, from the Daodejing, which as argued above, opposes asceticism?
Manu’s attitude to austerity and desire is actually much more complex than what the two
quotes above show. While the Laws of Manu does encourage an ascetic lifestyle, contrary
to most people in the West would believe nowadays, to Manu, austerity and desire are not
necessarily two incompatible concepts. Rather, they coexist harmoniously.
When the Self-existent One creates the world, according to the Laws of Manu, he
brought forth “time, divisions of time, constellations, planets, rivers, oceans, mountains,
flat and rough terrain, austerity, speech, sexual pleasure, desire and anger.” (M 1:24-25). In
other words, to Manu, both austerity and desire are among the natural characteristics of
human beings. The emphasis on adopting an ascetic lifestyle does not mean one should
eliminate his desire. In the Laws of Manu, desire, just like austerity, is regarded as
important to human beings and the whole society. One of the reasons not to relinquish
desire is that there are good desires, such as the desire of the Self-existent One to create the
world (M 1:8, 34, 75 and etc). Moreover, desire is the stimulus of vedic study and the
performance of vedic rites (M 2:2). Not only should one retain his desire, one also could
not detach from desire. The Laws of Manu explicitly states that “it is impossible here (in
this world) to be free from desire” (M 2:2) and that “nowhere in this world do we see any
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activity done by a man free from desire; for whatever at all that a man may do, it is the
work of someone who desires it (the impulse of desire)” (M 2:4).
How then, does Manu resolve the seeming contradiction between the retention of
desire and asceticism, which often associated with the relinquishment of desire? While the
Laws of Manu does not give an explicit answer, my supposition is that Manu shares with
Laozi a distinction between material austerity and mental asceticism, as well as the idea of
passively acting without actively desiring. When talking about austerity as an agent of
purification, Manu further distinguishes between the different levels of purification:

Purifying oneself with respect to wealth, tradition tells us,
is the highest of all purifications; for the truly pure man is
the one who is pure with respect to wealth, not the one who
becomes pure by using earth and water...
–– M 5:106

Can one be austere while acquiring wealth? At first sight, it seems odd for a person who
highly regards wealth to live a frugal life. However, Manu’s argument actually makes
sense. If a person respects wealth and yet still remains austere, he is purer than those who
live in austerity due to their aversion to wealth, because he manifests the true meaning of
austerity – it’s not a byproduct of other emotions or beliefs, such as aversion, but a
characteristic of dharma, or the natural state/spontaneity. Austerity derived from loathing
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of wealth is similar to the physical self-inflicting in that they are both superficial aspects of
austerity. On the other hand, austerity with respect to wealth is one on the mental level,
having dharma on its back. Asserting that the purity by “using earth and water” is inferior
to purity with respect to wealth, Manu clearly values mental purity more than physical
purity, and hence mental austerity more than material austerity. Meanwhile, it is important
to note that the Laws of Manu is not belittling material austerity as a whole, since mental
purity manifests materially. However, Msnu does place more value on mental purity (and
its manifesting material purity) than on other purity without spiritual/mental support. This
idea is strikingly similar to the concept of wuyu in the Daodejing. Asceticism does not
represents the essence of austerity or desire-less (wuyu), the natural/spontaneous state of
not actively desiring does.
Similar to differentiating two kinds of purification, the Laws of Manu, borrowing
from the Vedas, also prescribes two kinds of action: advancing and arresting. An action
performed in order to satisfy one’s desire is called an advancing act, and by engaging in
such an action, one “attains equality with the gods.” On the other hand, an action performed
without desire is termed as an arresting act, which “procures the supreme good,” and
whereby one “transcends the five elements” (M 12:88-90). Keeping in mind that according
to the Laws of Manu, it is impossible to be free from desire, how does one act without
desire? Is it ever possible to perform the arresting acts while desire is a natural part of
human beings ascribed by the Self-existing One when he creates the world? My attempted
answer to this seemingly paradoxical question is that Manu has a similar view on desire as
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the concept of wuyu in the Daodejing. To Laozi, the sages, who have manifested the dao,
are desire-less, not because they adopt an ascetic lifestyle, but because they act according
with the dao and are totally unaware of their desires. The advancing actions in the Laws of
Manu shares a similar idea. Since desires are so natural, it is possible that one can act
without actively desiring. Such a state is achieved when one manifests the dharma, and acts
according with the nature/spontaneity––while desire is a natural part of actions, the actor is
desire-less in his mental activities.
In the Daodejing, the notion of human desire or the lack of it (wuyu) is central to its
argument about human nature, and other important concepts regarding human nature, such
as zhizu contentment, wuxin no self-constructed self, and wuzheng “striving without
contentiousness” (RADH 68), are largely supporting or deriving from wuyu. However, in
the Laws of Manu, while austerity and desire (or the lack of it) are important aspects of
human natures, they are by no means central to the whole treatise. Another essential part of
the natural state of human beings addressed in the Laws of Manu is the hierarchy among the
four castes.
Manu first attempts to reinforces the hierarchy of caste system by stating that the
Brahmin’s excellence is designed by the Self-existing One along with his creation of the
world. He asserts that:

A man is said to be purer above the navel. Therefore, the
Self-existent One has declared, the mouth is his purest part.

33

Because he arose from the loftiest part of the body, because
he is the eldest, and because he retains the Veda, the
Brahmin is by Law the lord of this whole creation.
–– M 1:92-93

The account of the Self-existing One creating the world and the human species is
manipulated by Manu to justify the sociopolitical status of the brahmins among the other
castes. The Laws of Manu explicitly states that because of their noblest nature, a gift from
the god at their birth, the brahmins have “a clear right to this whole world,” and “this
whole world is the property” of them (M 1:100). However, it seems that Manu is not
convinced of the effectiveness of the statement about birth order in protecting the
exceptional status of the brahmins in the long run. He turns to the idea of natural
classification of duties and occupations for a stronger support:

I will now explain to you exactly which type of activity is
ascribed here to which type of creature, and also their
relative order with respect to birth.
–– M 1:42

While this quote is found in the excurses of the classification of fauna and flora, the idea of
assigning certain activities as natural to certain groups of creatures is extended to the
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classification among the four castes. Just as each type of animals and plants have different
duties or jobs according with their birth, the different castes of people each has its own
occupations––“reciting and teaching the Veda, offering and officiating at sacrifices, and
receiving and giving gifts” for the Brahmin; “protecting the subjects, giving gifts, offering
sacrifices, reciting the Veda and avoiding attachment to sensory objects” for the ksatriya;
“looking after animals, giving gifts, offering sacrifices, reciting the Veda, trade,
moneylending and agriculture” for the vaisya; “ungrudging service of” the upper castes for
the sudra (M 1:91). These caste-constraint activities are deemed as the natural way of
people’s life and hence the dharma and the sacred, unchangeable order among the different
castes of people.
People may argue that the account of human nature in the Laws of Manu serves
primarily to reinforce the sociopolitical status of the brahmins, and therefore represents a
sharp distinction from that in the Daodejing, which emphasizes the forgetting/ignoring of
the self-constructed ego, as well as a solidary community among all people. While I believe
there is some truth in the first part of the argument––the Laws of Manu does protect the
brahmins as the highest caste––I don’t think the understanding of sociopolitical order of
Manu and that of Laozi are on the opposite side. It is true that the the Laws of Manu
explicitly places a certain caste of people above the others, but is the ideal society, as
proposed by Laozi, when the dao is fully manifested, an equal society with no existing
hierarchy? The notion of “one muddled mind” may give us the answer. While on one hand,
the muddled mind embodies a regime not totalitarian, as argued in earlier paragraphs; on
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the other hand, the society with a muddled mind is also not an egalitarian one. It is
important to note that the ideal society proposed in the Daodejing does not represent
conventional justice. The best social order to Laozi does not aim to find the middle way as
stated in the Confucian classics, nor does it have to follows the principle of checks and
balances in the liberal democratic ideal. For a society to be supreme, according to the
Daodejing, all it need is the manifestation of the dao, which does not have to be just in the
conventional sense, as we will see in the next chapter.

Chapter 3 The Path to Harmony and Human Flourishing and
Its political Implications
Happiness is one of the most important topics in the Laws of Manu. In fact, the
whole work can be understood as a manual of achieving a happy life and afterlife. Manu
states that a learned man should strictly follows the law proper to him/her according to the
scriptures and tradition, because doing so enables him/her to “achieve fame in this world
and unsurpassed happiness (सख
ु म ्; sukham) after death” (M 2:9). In other words, Manu
believes that one should always do the “right things” that would lead him to happiness, and
that the whole text, detailing which kinds of activities are proper to people of which castes,
aims to instruct people their caste-specific rights and duties, so that they can achieve
happiness. Arguably, the intention of compiling the Laws of Manu is to lead a path to
happiness among people of all castes.
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According to Manu, to fulfill one’s dharma is to perform one’s duties and to
exercise one’s capabilities, both determined naturally by birth. Because of the relatively
fixed duties and capabilities for each caste, people can easily find their own places in the
world, whereby completing the world into a Oneness that is harmonious and fulfilling. In
this sense, the caste system—at least in theory—brings happiness to everyone, including
the Sudra. Unlike what people from other cultures tend to believe, the caste system may not
be a dreadful system to the Sudra. Rather, they may feel content with their life as they
believe they are fulfilling their dharma, performing the natural way of life, and working
towards their “human flourishing.” The idea of human flourishing is fundamental to
understanding the Laws of Manu. While the word “happiness” appears frequently in the
text, readers must note that the idea of happiness in the Laws of Manu is by no means the
same as the concept of happiness commonly understood in contemporary English usage.
Rather, it is closer to human flourishing, as I will explain in more details in the following
paragraphs.
For one thing, the Laws of Manu advocates asceticism, both physical and mental.
While mainstream understanding of happiness has not gone so far as to equal the pursuit of
happiness to hedonism, the majority of people today definitely would not consider
self-abnegation as a means of achieving happiness. Moreover, whereas people today tend
to believe that slavery is against human rights and that no slave can be called happy, the
Laws of Manu sees slavery in another way. According to Manu, the Self-existing One
assigned “ungrudging service of the upper castes” as the duty of the Sudra, the lowest
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castes of all Indians. And it is through the manifestation of the laws, the tradition, the
intention of the Self-existing One, and nature (which are ultimately all the one thing), and
the performance of their slavish service that the Sudra could achieve happiness. Just as
Manu carefully notes that one achieves “unsurpassed happiness after death,” the
experience of this life is not necessarily pleasurable.
Another difference between the concept of happiness in the Laws of Manu and that
of the twenty-first century is that Manu’s happiness is more community/caste-based.
People living in contemporary liberal democracies generally accept the idea that people
have the fundamental right to freely pursue happiness in their own ways, as long as doing
so does not violate the laws or the rights of others. However, to Manu, there is no
individual understanding of what happiness means––it is predetermined by the
Self-existing One/nature, neither is there an individual way of achieving it––people of the
same caste share exactly the same way of attaining happiness. Furthermore, according to
the Laws of Manu, the “self” element should be limited in one’s path to happiness:

When by the passion of his spirit he frees himself from
attachment to every object of passion, then he wins eternal
happiness (सख
ु ं; sukhaṁ) both here and in the hereafter.
–– M 6:80
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In the mainstream understanding of happiness today, one feels happy when one have
achieved something he desires, but to Manu, happiness is gained through detaching oneself
from his desires. Similar to the idea of freeing oneself from one’s passions, Manu
advocates that people perform with a subjectless/passive mental state, because it is through
doing so that one becomes closer to their natural state, closer to the teaching of the
scriptures and tradition, and hence closer to happiness. The Sanskrit word of happiness
used by Manu is sukha, which can also be translated as bliss or ease. It represents a state of
a lasting happiness, as opposed to the sanskrit word preya, which denotes a transient
pleasure. Manu is less concerned with the material abundance or satisfaction, which is
usually momentarily and untenable, than with the long-term happiness derived from
self-confidence and self-fulfillment.
In this sense, happiness in the Laws of Manu is better termed as human flourishing.
It is not necessarily pleasurable, such as the ascetic work for the Brahmin and the slavish
work for the Sudra. It is also not individualized or self-generated, since 1) acts should be
performed without consideration of oneself, and 2) people of the same caste share the same
vision of what happiness is and how to attain it. Therefore, the concept of happiness in the
Laws of Manu is closer to the idea of human flourishing than to way ‘happiness’ is usually
understood in the context of liberal democratic societies. Happiness here is not the same as
leading a pleasurable life, having abundant food, being close to the people significant to
oneself, obtaining what one has longed for, and so on. Most importantly, it is leading a
meaningful or significant life; i.e. fulfilling one’s dharma by performing selflessly the
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natural duties assigned to him/her by the Self-existing One, which includes studying the
Vedas and performing sacrifices for the Brahmins, offering “ungrudging service of the
upper castes” for the Sudra, and so on. Such activities are meaningful and grant people a
fulfilling life, according to Manu. Moreover, happiness is not only an individual matter in
the Laws of Manu, it is closely related to the duties and capabilities of the (caste-based)
community that one belongs to. Rather than the feeling of happiness when one meets with a
friend after a long period of separation or when one finally accomplishes something after
several attempts, the concept of happiness in the Laws of Manu concerns all human
beings––it is about how the four different castes of people dwell harmoniously together; it
is, again, at least in theory, about the flourishing of the human kind as a whole.
Because of the importance of working on one’s duties and capabilities in one’s
attainment of happiness, it is not surprising that Manu emphasizes disciplines and rules of
conduct, as following orders and rules is central to one’s duties/dharma. For example,
Manu elaborates in details the regulations in an ancestral offering (M 3:122-285), the rules
in a Vedic initiation (M 2:26-64) and proper salutation for a student (M 2:117-133). He also
highly values obedience, especially to teachers and parents. He states that “obedient service
to [teachers and parents] is said to be the highest form of ascetic toil. For [teachers, mothers
and fathers] are the three Vedas; and they alone are called the three sacred fires” (M 2:229).
One one hand, because many orders and rules in the Law of Manu conform with the
hierarchy of the caste system, stressing their importance and linking them with nature and
happiness through dharma helps reinforce the Brahmin’s privilege. On the other hand, it is
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noteworthy that quite a few of the rules are harsh to the Brahmins, like the one that states a
Brahmin “who does not know how to return a greeting… is no better than a Sudra” (M
2:126), showing that rules in the Laws of Manu are not entirely written to strengthen the
Brahmin’s social status. Similarly, Manu connects social conventions and politics with
nature through dharma; one may hold that Manu does so to convince people to follow laws
that benefit the Brahmin, still others can argue that he does so because he sincerely believes
following the laws make everyone from every caste fulfilling. Moreover, while Manu has
not gone as far as the Buddhists who claim that one’s nobility lies in how one acts, rather
than which caste one belongs to, he does suggest that birth status, though important, is only
fulfilled by one’s behaviors. Stressing the importance of human relation between students
and teachers, children and parents, and valuing one’s noble acts over one’s birth, the Laws
of Manu clearly comprises some humanities move.
Arguably, reinforcing the caste system and emphasizing discipline are the most
important elements in the Laws of Manu, and perhaps, Manu employed the idea of human
flourishing in order to convince people the “excellence of the Brahmin” (M 1:92-101), and
to formalize rules of conduct that would benefit the Brahmin. On one hand, Manu
establishes the view “the Brahmin are always the noblest” by connecting the Brahmin’s
privilege with the celestial power of the Self-existing One, as illustrated by the creation of
beings. However, he seems to believe that merely relating the excellence of the Brahmin to
God’s power is insufficient to ensure long term protection of the Brahmin’s privileged
status. He also draws help from the power of nature and the concept of happiness/human
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flourishing. He emphasizes the importance of strictly following the disciplines stated in his
law, most of which reflect the caste system’s hierarchy and serve the interest of the
Brahmins. Manu convinces his people that rules and orders in his law are closely related to
nature, or dharma, and that abiding themselves by the established rules is fulfilling their
natural duties and manifesting their dharma, which in turns grant them “unsurpassed
happiness” (M 2:9). In other words, Manu inculcates people of the lower castes that their
only way of attaining happiness is serving the interest of the nobler castes, because merely
by doing so could they dwell harmoniously with their natural state, or dharma.
Manu not only strengthens the noblest status of the Brahmins through the
philosophical congruence of dharma and happiness, he does so also by assigning political
duties to the kings, and by depriving the lower castes of property:

The king should make Vaisyas pursue trade, moneylending,
agriculture, and cattle herding, and make Sudras engaging
in the service of twice-born people….
[Sudras,] tradition tells us, are without property.
–– M 8:410-416

In a harmonious society ruled by a good king, according to the Laws of Manu, the Vaisyas
and the Sudras engage in supportive work for the Brahmins and the Ksatriyas. It is the duty
of a king to make sure that the lower castes are doing such work, and that the Sudras have
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no property. If the king fails to do so, he is “throw[ing] this world into confusion” (M
8:418). It is interesting to note that to Manu, the nature, the dharma, the Vedas, the
tradition, his laws, (all of which are ultimately the same thing), are interdependent with
politics. On one hand, Manu states that it is the nature of the lower castes to perform
supporting work for the higher castes, and it is the nature of the Sudra to possess no
property. Manu believes that “nature” should not remain an abstract idea; instead, it is
important that the rulers carry it into the real political life, and make sure the people are
acting accordingly. In this sense, nature is dependent on politics to be manifested. On the
other hand, nature is the basis of how kings should rule. Kings are expected to ensure the
lower castes are doing their supporting work, not because doing so serves the interest of
himself/herself or his ingroup (while it probably does benefit the Ksatriyas and the
Brahmins, such benefits are not the intention, at least as argued by Manu), but because it
keeps the society in its harmonious natural state, preventing his people from confusion. In
this sense, politics is dependent on nature as its blueprint and guide.
While reinforcing the “excellence of the Brahmin” (M 1:92-101) is a central theme
of the Laws of Manu, as analyzed above, it is not necessarily the intention of the text. The
text aims at keeping the world in accordance with nature/dharma, and it is likely that the
fortification of the high social and religious status of the Brahmins is merely a byproduct of
this aim, as the nobleness of the Brahmins is part of nature/dharma. Therefore, the respect
paid to the Brahmins can be understood as merely a reverence for nature. Similarly, it is
probable that people respect the Brahmins for reasons more pragmatic than the hierarchical
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ideology that they are the highest caste. For example, when describing the proper conducts
for the king, Manu states that:

He should pay honour to Brahmins who have returned from
their teacher’s house; for this is the inexhaustible treasure
deposited with Brahmins decreed for kings.
Neither thief nor enemy can steal it, and it never perishes.
Therefore, the king should deposit this inexhaustible
treasure with Brahmins.
–– M 7:82-83

Manu seems to be asserting that while the kings should be devoted to the Brahmins, he is
less concerned with the theoretical excellence of the Brahmins. Rather, the kings should do
so because the Brahmins have made the most valuable contribution to their reigns and to
their states––i.e., knowledge about the Vedas. Admittedly, whether the study of the Vedas
is valuable to the rule of the kings is purely an ideological/philosophical question.
Nonetheless, for the kings, as least as they are described in the Laws of Manu, a major
reason of their devotion to the Brahmins is based on political considerations.
Just as the excellence of the Brahmins is not as important as many people would
have thought, the lives of the lower castes are not as travial. For one thing, their supportive
work is integral to maintain the harmonious balance of the world in its natural state.
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Moreover, a Ksatriya, member of the ruling class, has as his duties/dharma the obligation
to protect “all of his subjects” (M 7:144), including the Sudras. Similarly, when accounting
for the origin of kingship (M 7:2-36), Manu states that the Creator creates a king so that
people would have a shelter:

The king was created as the protector of people belonging
to all social classes and orders of life who, according to
their rank, are devoted to the Law specific to them.
–– M 7:35

According to the Laws of Manu, anyone, including the Sudras, would attain unsurpassed
happiness as long as they follow the duties and capabilities specific to him/her, and
manifests his dharma. To fulfill such a “promise,” the Self-existing One creates a king,
who, at least theoretically, would protect the happiness of all people. The kings may, or are
even supposed to, keep the Sudras busy with their service to the upper castes, and punish
severely those who fail in their task. The ruling of the kings may seem inhumane to the
eyes of people living in contemporary liberal democracies, but in the Laws of Manu, it is
conceptualized as necessary to the maintenance of the harmony of the society, and to the
ensurance of the happiness of the lower castes. In this sense, the political order and the
Ksatriyas benefit the lower castes. Even the more radical argument of the Brahmins serving
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the interest of the lower castes is tenable, since the Brahmins, with their Vedas study,
support the politics, and therefore the lower castes indirectly.
While the Laws of Manu envisions a harmonious world where every person would
feel “happy,” content and fulfilling, when he manifests the dharma specific to his caste, the
Daodejing similarly proposes that a society in its natural state accordant with the dao
would be safe, peaceful, and flourishing (anpingtai DDJ 35). The idea of peace in Chinese,
however, also implies a sense of stableness and thus plainness. In the same chapter, Laozi
describes dao:

But were way-making (dao) to be put into words:
It could be said to be so bland and insipid
that it has no taste.
–– DDJ 35

On on hand, this depiction of dao may be a provocative rendering of its nature. The dao is
the natural way of one’s being, and therefore is nothing more than a mundane habituality,
far from something splendid. Yet, on the other hand, the Daodejing probably stresses the
blandness and insipidness of dao to convey the message that the practicing of dao brings a
person accordance with the rest of the world, rather than making him/her exceptional. In
this sense, dao is plain because it does not help one to stand out among others. The idea of
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“softening” oneself is expressed twice in the Daodejing, with the same phrases (though not
in the same order), which is rare in the text. In chapter 4, Laozi compares dao to an abyss:

It blunts the sharp edges and untangles the knots,
It softens (he) the glare and
brings things together on the same track.
So cavernously deep––it only seems to persist.
––DDJ 4

The manifestation of dao requires one to situate herself in the world without imposing her
accomplishments. One may have lots of glorious achievements, but dao requires her to be
detached from those accomplishments, blunting her sharp edges and softening her glare, so
as to fit into the world in her natural way. It is only through such a practice that one can
“persist,” not in the sense of immortality, but continued flourishing. In chapter 56, Laozi
repeats the same phrases of “soften the glare,” “bring things together on the same track,”
“blunt the sharp edges,” “untangle the knots,” and states that doing so “is called the
profoundest consonance.” The term translated by Ames and Hall as “softening” here is he
和, which is also the word for harmony. In Laozi’s perspective, harmony and consonance is
achieved through the softening of self and the uniting within the society.
The Daodejing resembles the Laws of Manu in that they both emphasize that the
manifestation of dao and dharma give rise to a harmonious and flourishing community.
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Moreover, manifesting the dao is following one’s natural habituality, just like the
practicing of one’s dharma in the Laws of Manu. However, unlike Manu, who assigns
specific dharma for each of the castes, Laozi does not explicitly instruct his readers as to
what their naturalness comprises. While the Indian readers of Manu can be confident that
they have entered a path of “happiness” as long as they fulfill their caste-specific duties,
such as studying the Vedas or herding cattles, the Chinese readers of the Daodejing are not
given similar guidance on what to do on the day-to-day basis. The idea of manifesting the
dao remains ambiguous, probably because dao is “nameless:”

Dao that can be put into words is not really dao,
And naming that can assign fixed reference to things
 is not really naming.
–– DDJ 1

The concept of “nameless,” similar to “desireless” wuyu, and “heartmind-less” wuxin, is
not a conventional negation, but rather an affirmation of the nature/dao. Instead of arguing
that dao is so obscure and mysterious that language cannot capture its insights, Laozi
probably considers dao nameless because of its fluid and dynamic nature. The quote above,
just like “desireless,” is not to be read literally. One need to refer to the Daoist cosmos to
better understand this quote. Because the Daoist cosmos is ever-changing, the possibility of
the manifestation of dao is infinite. When Laozi says dao cannot be put into words, he is
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not rendering dao into an abstract or obscure idea; on the contrary, dao is always concrete,
as it is nothing more than the day-to-day behaviors of the sages. Laozi is reluctant to
associate certain acts with “the natural way of being,” as Manu has done, not because he
believes conventional language cannot capture the obscure insight of dao, but simply
because language cannot capture in full its possibilities, which are infinite.
However, the Daodejing does include some general principles for everyday
conduct, such as being humble and dedicated in resetting the balance of the world. Both in
the beginning (CH2) and to the end (CH77) of the Daodejing, Laozi describes the sages in
the same way: “they act on behalf of things but do not lay any claim to them, they see
things through to fruition but do not take credit for them.” The Daodejing is consciously
reminding its readers to be humble and not be boast their own achievements. This quote is
also closely related to the idea of objectless desire wuyu, and subject-less mentality wuxin,
as discussed in the previous chapter. Laozi argues that the sages, who manifest the dao, do
not actively desire to obtain or attain something, but rather, they passively live with their
possession and accomplishments. While the mental states of wuyu and wuxin are central to
the Daodejing, practical manifestations of these mental states, i.e. the activities brought
about by these mental states, are by no means secondary. Indeed, according to the
Daodejing, the “essence” of dao, such as wuyu and wuxin, are nothing more than its
manifestation in the conventional world, or the actions inspired by it, such as “acting on
behalf of things.” In another word, dao is ultimately dao-ing.
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Good politics, according to the Daodejing, is similarly nothing more than the
wholesome behaviors of the sages, especially their interactions with the other people. One
of the most famous lines in the Daodejing on human relation between the sages and the
populace is certainly:

Sages too [like the heavens and the earth] are not
partial to institutionalized morality.
They treat the common people as straw dogs.
––DDJ 5

This idea of treating people merely as artificial dogs made of straws, which were used as
sacrifice in ancient China and would be abandoned soon after the rites, may seem
inhumane to contemporary democratic liberals. Indeed, in contemporary usage, the phrase
“[the heaven and the earth tiandi] treat [all things wanwu] as straw dogs” (DDJ 5) is
usually used to lament the misfortune of a certain person. Clearly, the general perception of
treating people as straw dogs is negative––people are so insignificant to nature or to the
sages, and nature/the sages are so indifferent to people’s happiness. However, impartiality
does not necessarily mean cruelty. People in contemporary time may be so used to their
privilege that they think not being favored by nature/environment/gods is a deprival of their
right. However, to Laozi, an impartial ruler is beneficial to her people, since the people
would not be diverted from their nature/dao from the ruler. Similarly, people would be able
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to dwell with/manifest their “genuine moral feeling” (RADH 84), which Laozi considers
superior to the artificial “civilization” represented in Confucianism. While heaven and
earth, or sages and rulers, may be indifferent to the populace, people are taken good care of
by dao, as discussed in the previous chapter. In fact, it may be the interference of the rulers
that has a negative effect on people’s happiness/flourishing.
Similar to the “straw dogs theory,” the argument that the sages need to empty their
people’s heart-minds may also sound appalling to many contemporary democratic liberals:

...in the proper governing by the sages:
They empty the heart-minds of the people and fill their stomachs,
They weaken their aspirations and strengthen their bones,
Ever teaching the common people to be unprincipled in
their knowing (wuzhi) and objectless in their desire (wuyu)
––DDJ 3

At first glance, such a statement seems to be an advocate for the rulers to brainwash their
people––depriving them from knowledge and caring only about their material life. Without
a better understanding of the idea of dao/nature/spontaneity in the Daodejing, the society
described above does sound similar to the animal farm depicted by George Orwell.
However, according to the reasoning in the Daodejing, emptying one’s heart-mind does not
imply emptying one’s brain. On the contrary, Laozi believes that by emptying one’s
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heart-mind, one stands closer with the truth, and sees the world as it is genuinely. He states
that people who manifest the dao know about the world without traveling or seeing things
happen (DDJ 47). In Laozi’s perspective, people ‘know’ about the world instinctively, but
civilization has distorted their pure understanding of the world. If anything, the idea of
emptying one’s heart-mind and being unprincipled in one’s knowing is anti-brainwashing,
as it is fighting against the false knowledge (at least to Laozi) imposed by civilization and
society.
Moreover, readers should keep in mind that while the sages empty their people’s
heart-minds and weaken their aspirations, they do so wuwei-ly. As a wu form, wuwei 無為
(lit. non-doing), is not a conventional negation of wei (doing). It is performing according to
nature/dao. For the sage rulers, it more specifically means ruling non-coercively and not
imposing regulations/ideologies on their people. Therefore, when Laozi says the sages
empty people’s heart-minds, weaken their aspirations, make them unprincipled in their
knowing, he is not suggesting that the sages actively deprive their people of knowledge,
ambitions, and the way to human flourishing. Rather, the sages are letting their people to
develop and to flourish themselves. In the time when the Daodejing was written, states
were increasingly adopting the idea of ritual structure and hierarchy. Laozi opposes this
idea and insists that sagacious rulers do not actively impose ideologies or regulations on
their people, since those impositions conflict with dao, or people’s spontaneity. Not filling
people’s heart-minds with strict rules or a single set of ideologies, but rather “making sure
that basic needs such as food and health are provided for” (RADH 82) and letting people to
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develop flourishing lives according with the dao––this may be the true teaching of Laozi,
when he says rulers should “empty the heart-minds and fill the stomachs” of the
commoners. Since the Daoist cosmos is dynamic, and since dao implies infinite
possibilities for people, the people under the rule of sagacious rulers are in fact full of
opportunities and creativity (i.e., ongoing (re)productive power), when their heart-minds
are empty of imposed regulations and ideologies.
Some people may misunderstand Laozi’s opposition to hierarchy and established
institution as an advocate of anarchy. Such an argument, however, neglects that the
Daodejing also emphasizes order. On one hand, under the framework of the Daodejing,
there are always rulers and the ruled. The best type of society that Laozi has envisioned is
one where the common people know nothing about their ruler, except for the fact that she
exists (DDJ 17). Even for the ideal society, there still exists a government, according to the
Daodejing. On the other hand, the non-coercive rule (wuwei) gives rise to order, instead of
chaos:

We [the sages] do things noncoercively (wuwei)
And the common people develop along their own lines;
We cherish equilibrium (jing)
And the common people order themselves
––DDJ 57
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The non-coercive rule of the sages leave people room to follow their genuine
feeling/spontaneity like “unworked wood” (DDJ 57), and by doing so, the people dwell
with harmonious order. Laozi argues that “were the nobles and the kings able to respect
this [dao and the practice of wuwei], all things would be able to develop along their own
lines” (DDJ 37). In this sense, the Daodejing is not proposing the destruction of established
institutions. Rather, Laozi promotes a ‘tolerance’ that enables the people to flourish in their
own, while working within the system. With such a political approach, people in the regime
share "one muddled mind" (DDJ 53)––they may have different career path, different
lifestyle and different value theories, but they belong to one community, a harmonious,
orderly one. And this is why Laozi argues that the sages "does things noncoercively and yet
nothing goes undone" (DDJ 48; lit. the sages do not act and yet have done everything).
As suggested in the paragraphs above, the argument that the Laws of Manu
advocates unification while the Daodejing prefers anarchy is untenable. Both works
express high regard for social order. The difference between the political theories of the
two texts does not lie in their attitude to people's happiness, either. Some people may
mistakenly consider the Laws of Manu a justification of exploitation of the lower castes,
while the Daodejing gives people more freedom and is thus more humane. It is true that
upon the basis of ensuring the people have enough food and healthy bodies, the sages in the
Daodejing are more open to diversity, while the kings in the Laws of Manu punish those
fail to abide by their strict rules. However, they are both concerned with the happiness of
the common people, at least so they argue. The difference, in fact, lies in their different
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conceptualizations of happiness (and this different approach to happiness, in turn, lies in
their different understanding of nature, dao and dharma). While Manu argues that
"happiness" for people derived from their fulfillment of their caste specific
duties/capacities, Laozi believes that "happiness" depends on people's having access to
their opened possibilities under the realm of dao/nature.

Conclusion
The analysis in the paragraph above may easily (and maybe usually) lead to a
misunderstanding that Manu pursue his cause of bringing a fulfilling life to his readers by
restricting their behaviors and manners, making sure that they act in accordance with
dharma, while Laozi does so by imposing no restrictions on them for his readers and
thereby creating an free environment for them to dwell flourishingly. Such an interpretation
is flawed in that it takes for granted that the caste specific duties/capacities in the Laws of
Manu are restrictions for people, and that the opened possibilities and ever-changing
cosmos in the Daodejing mean people are absolutely free. This misunderstanding is similar
to the attributions of the Laws of Manu to a despotic law and the Daodejing to an apolitical
work and even anarchist manifesto. They all neglect that both the caste specific
duties/capacities in the Laws of Manu and the opened opportunities in the Daodejing are
respectively the essence of dharma and dao. In other words, they are the harmonious
natural way of being. Manu’s readers, regardless of caste, perform their own dharma,
55

position themselves effortlessly in the world, and are in turn, opened up to enormous
opportunities within their dharma, including procuring the supreme good and attaining
equalities with the gods (M 12:88-90). The readers of the Daodejing, on the other hand, do
have few “active” restrictions from their sagacious rulers, but meanwhile, they are also
confined by nature/dao, such as being wuyu and wuxin, as well as the “passive” rule of the
sages, who “act” in accordance with dao.
Both texts are human-centered. Despite the accusation of being inhumane to the
lower castes, especially the Sudras, the Laws of Manu is in fact entirely a manual
instructing every human being ways of achieving a fulfilling life, and even one that
resembles the gods. Similarly, despite the flawed impression that the Daodejing is
mysterious and despite the misreading of the wu-forms as a spiritual negation of self, the
Daodejing actually affirms the importance of an agential “self” in dao, since dao is nothing
more than one’s everyday actions—albeit in a transformed, spontaneous mode. Both the
Laws of Manu and the Daodejing conceptualize a way of being “natural.” They present a
vision of a harmonious and fulfilling life, which must be manifested in everyday activities.
The manifestations of nature may be different in the two texts––caste specific
duties/capacities in the Laws of Manu versus the more general opportunities in the
Daodejing, but ultimately, they are about one thing––flourishing by the people and for the
people.

56

Bibliography
Ames, Roger, and David Hall, eds. Dao De Jing: Making This Life Significant: A
Philosophical Translation. 1st ed. (New York: Ballantine Books, 2003). (RADH; DDJ)
Brugmann, Karl, Elements of the Comparative Grammar of the Indo-Germanic languages,
Volume III, B. (New York: Westermann & Co., 1892). (Brugmann)
Das, Subhamoy. “The Laws of Manu, or Manusmriti.” ThoughtCo. (Das)
Dirks, Nicholas. “The Reformation of Caste: Periyar, Ambedkar, and Gandhi,” Castes of
Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India, pp. 255–74. (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2001). (Dirks)
Easwaran, Eknath. The Bhagavad Gita. 2nd ed. (Tomales: Nilgiri Press, 2007). (Easwaran)
Gandhi, Mahatma. Hinduism According to Gandhi. (Delhi: Orient paperbacks, 2013).
(Gandhi)
Gillespie, Mark. “Taoism and Anarchy,” Strike-The-Root: A Journal Of Liberty, October
21, 2003. (Gillespie)
Ivanhoe, P. J, and Laozi. The Daodejing of Laozi (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2001).
(Ivanhoe)
Jayaram, V. “Hinduism and Caste System.” (Jayram)
Jia, Junhua. “The Religious Origin of Dao and De.” Studies of Chinese Culture. Summer
2012. (Jia)
Jones, William. The Works of Sir William Jones: With the Life of the Author by Lord
Teignmouth. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). (Jones)
Josh. “Anarchism and Taoism,” The Anarchist Library. (Josh)
Laozi, and Robert G Henricks. Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching: A Translation of the Startling New
Documents Found at Guodian. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000). (H)
Manu, Patrick. Olivelle, and Suman. Olivelle. Manu's Code of Law : A Critical Edition and
Translation of the Manava-Dharmasastra. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). (M)

57

Rix, Helmut, ed. Lexikon der indogermanischen Verben. (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert
Verlag, 2001). (Rix)
Verellen, Franciscus. “Laozi.” In Finding Wisdom in East Asian Classics, pp. 5–79. (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2011). (Verellen)
Yi, Daoshan, Xinyang shi yimian qizhi: Sixiang, Shiping, Wenshi suibiji [Faith is a flag: a
Collection of Thoughts, Commentaries and Eassys]. (Shijie Huayu Chubanshe, 2016). (Yi)

58

